DIVERSITY REMOVAL WHERE THE FEDERAL COURT
WOULD NOT HAVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
A SUGGESTED REFORM
Under some circumstances, a federal district court has removal jurisdiction in diversity cases where it would not have had original jurisdiction
over the action, i.e., when one of the defendants is a cocitizen with one or
more of the plaintiffs. The present provision governing such cases, section 1441 (c) of the Judicial Code,1 is unsatisfactory and should be repealed
in favor of a provision submitted by the American Law Institute as a part
2
of its proposed changes in the Judicial Code.
The reason traditionally given for diversity jurisdiction is the fear
that the courts of one state may discriminate against the citizens of another
state. 3 Today a variety of other justifications is offered, none of which
presents a compelling reason for the continuation of diversity jurisdiction. 4
Yet, since the availability of diversity jurisdiction may explain why there
is no overriding fear of local prejudice and because diversity is a part of
our judicial fabric 5 embodied in the Constitution, there is little chance that
it will be abolished. Therefore, inquiry into the underlying considerations
which should govern the exercise of diversity jurisdiction is both necessary
and useful. Under each of the various theories (even the one based on the
notion that the federal courts are intrinsically better than state courts) 6
the most favored candidate for diversity jurisdiction is that defendant who
might be prejudiced in a state court due to his nonresident status.
In removal cases involving nonfederal issues the purpose of federal
diversity jurisdiction becomes a particularly important question, since there
is a direct exertion of federal power upon a state institution when a federal court acts to deprive a state court of its jurisdiction. In addition to
depriving the plaintiff of his chosen forum, removal in cases involving
partly diverse defendants can deprive the nondiverse defendant of his right
to have the case heard in the courts of his own state.7 The exercise of such
power should rest upon the vindication of a clear federal interest in the case.
128 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964).

2 ALI, STUDY OF THE DivisioN OF JURISDIcTION BETwEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS (Official Draft, Part I, 1965) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY].
3 See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 892

(1953).

4 See ALI STUDY 50. Contra, Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction,
73 YALE L.J. 7 (1963). For a discussion of alternative justifications of diversity
jurisdiction see Other Suggested Rationales for Diversity Jurisdiction, in ALI STUDY
(Appendix A).
5
See cases annotated in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (Supp. 1964).
been nearly 200 reported cases involving § 1441(c).

Since 1948 there have

6 ALI STUDY 48.

728 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964): "the district court may . . . in its discretion
remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction."
If the court chooses not to remand the nondiverse defendant's cause of action,
there is no practical recourse for him, and the case will be tried in the federal court.
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The present section of the Judicial Code which deals with removal in
cases involving partially diverse defendants is 1441 (c).8 It explains how
to determine whether such removal should be allowed in terms somewhat
divorced from any coherent policy reflecting a clear federal interest. The
provision reads as follows:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one
or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the
entire case may be removed and the district court may determine
all issues therein, or in its discretion, may remand all matters not
otherwise within its original jurisdiction."
An analysis of this section shows that it is essentially an "if-then"
statement. When the court finds the "if" portion of the statement to be
satisfied, i.e., when there are "separate and independent causes of action"
present, it can proceed to apply the "then" portion of the statute. The
statute gives no indication, however, as to how the crucial operative "if"
words, "separate and independent," are to be defined or what policies are
to be followed or recognized in the process.
Thus in applying this section the courts presently do not have to
reach the fundamental question of whether the defendant is of the type who
should be given the protection of removal to the federal courts. They need
only determine whether there is a "separate and independent claim or
cause of action" which, if sued upon alone, would involve completely diverse plaintiffs and defendants. 10 That determination, made by resolving a
procedural problem revolving around the nature of a cause of action, is
governed by considerations not directly related to the central issue of diversity jurisdiction-protecting the prejudice-vulnerable defendant.
The reason for this lack of policy direction and the resultant procedural nature of the operative question posed by section 1441(c) may be
found in the provision's history. Section 1441 replaced section 71, which
read in part as follows:
And when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a
controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States,
8 See generally 1 BARRON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 105

(Wright rev. ed. 1960) ; 1A MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE 0.163 (2d ed. 1965) ; WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS § 39 (1963) ; Cohen, Problems in the Removal of a "Separate and
Independent Claim or Cause of Action," 46 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1961); Lewin, The
Federal Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Removal of "Separate and Independent"
Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66 HARV. L. REv. 423 (1953) ; Moore & VanDercreek,
Multi-party, Multi-claim Removal Problems: The Separate and Independent Claim
Under Section 1441(c), 46 IowA L. REv. 489 (1961).

928 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964).
10 See, e.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 11 (1951) ; McLeod
v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 233 F.2d 242, 246 (10th Cir. 1956) ; Roby v. Maine Cent. R.R.,
243 F. Supp. 153 (D.N.H. 1965) ; Eller v. M.L.D. Trust, 241 F. Supp. 800 (D. Mont.
1965).
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and which can be fully determined as between them, then either
one or more of the defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the district court of the United
States .

.

.

And where a suit is now pending or may here-

after be brought in any State court, in which there is a controversy between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought
and a citizen of another State, any defendant, being such citizen
of another State, may remove such suit into the district court
. . . when it shall be made to appear to said district court that
from prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court, or in any other State court to which the
said defendant may, under the laws of the State, have the right,
on account of such prejudice or local influence, to remove said
11
cause.
The latter portion of this provision was apparently aimed at allowing
removal whenever local prejudice could be demonstrated 2 -- a demonstration which could be exceedingly difficult if not impossible. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has noted, 13 the local prejudice which is feared is not of the
type which lends itself to ready detection. 14 This will be particularly true
if the district judge involved shares an unconscious commitment to local
"1Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1094.
12 See 1A MoR_, FEDERAL PRATIcE 1f0.159, at 443 (2d ed. 1965).
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336-37 (1943) (dissenting opinion):
The reasons which led Congress to grant . . . [diversity] jurisdiction to
the federal courts are familiar. It was believed that, consciously or otherwise,
the courts of a state may favor their own citizens. Bias against outsiders
may become embedded in a judgment of a state court and yet not be sufficiently
apparent to be made the basis of a federal claim. To avoid possible discriminations of this sort, so the theory goes, a citizen of a state other than
that in which he is suing or being sued ought to be able to go into a wholly
impartial tribunal, namely, the federal court sitting in that state. Thus, the
basic premise of federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of the parties'
citizenship is that the federal courts should afford remedies which are coextensive with rights created by state law and enforceable in state courts.
'3

That is the theory of diversity jurisdiction. Whether it is a sound theory,
whether diversity jurisdiction is necessary or desirable in order to avoid
possible unfairness . . . are matters which are not my concern as a judge.

They are the concern of those whose business it is to legislate, not mine. I
speak as one who has long favored the entire abolition of diversity jurisdiction.
14This Comment excludes consideration of cases involving racial prejudice, since
they are in a sense an abnormal strain on the system and should not be considered
in trying to determine how a general system will operate under normal conditions.
If the only prejudice to be feared is that which is so strongly felt and clearly wrong,
then the maintenance of a system of diversity jurisdiction cannot be founded upon it,
since the problem lends itself to less subtle solutions and more direct action. The
need for diversity jurisdiction must be founded in the need to avoid exposing out of
staters to the less keenly felt prejudice which springs from adherence to and acceptance
of ordinary local norms and which would be virtually undetectable in judicial deliberations.
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social values which are at the root of subtle discrimination against out15
siders.
The pattern of the cases which arose under section 71 supports the
notion that the reaction of the bar was to avoid the difficult task of demonstrating discrimination.' 6 Counsel applied themselves diligently to the task
of finding "separable controversies." Since this inquiry focused attention
on a neutral issue of procedure, it was easier for the courts to deal with
than was the more relevant but more embarrassing question of whether the
court was in fact prejudiced. This latter problem was very likely avoided
by the bar for another intensely practical reason. Defendants remove and
are gone, leaving behind counsel who must then practice before the courts
they have called "prejudiced."
What happened under section 71, then, is clear. Judicial attention and
effort were focused not on the problem of whether the defendant should be
allowed to remove because he faced a prejudiced court, but upon the nature
of the plaintiff's pleading. Thus the plaintiff's characterization of the case,
which is governed by factors generally unrelated to diversity removal,
tended to control its disposition on that question, since if the complaint
set up some kind of "separable controversy" between plaintiff and defendant, the court would allow removal.1 7 Section 1441(c) was to follow
the pattern of section 71 in looking to the plaintiff's pleading to determine
8
whether removal should be allowed.'
If removal jurisdiction is to be administered on an intelligible, consistent basis, the position of the defendant seeking removal should be the
central element of concern. The law should directly consider his eligibility
to remove unhampered by procedural notions such as the "independence"
of the plaintiff's various claims. 19 If the defendant becomes the focal point
5
1 Even where the district judge shares local values which might lead to discrimination, removal improves the position of the prejudice-vulnerable defendant. He
is given the protection of a broader jury selection, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and a judge whose duty is to the central government. This last factor may
well overcome the personal bias of a district judge who might, nevertheless, be unable
to detect similar bias on the part of his brothers on the state bench.
16See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1938) & cases cited therein at
538; Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Co., 277 U.S. 54 (1927); cf. St. Paul Indem.
Co. v. Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 286 (1938) (discussion of history of removal without
mention of discrimination clause of old § 71).
7 See, e.g., Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1945).
Is Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957) (plaintiff chose not to assert federal claim); Roby v. Maine
Cent. R.R., 243 F. Supp. 153 (D.N.H. 1965) (plaintiffs brought separate suits which
could have been joined) ; Garroutte v. General Motors Corp., 179 F. Supp. 315 (W.D.
Ark. 1959) (plaintiff's motive in shaping pleadings irrelevant) ; Wade v. New York
Fire Ins. Co., 111 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Wash. 1953) (court would not look at affidavits;
pleading controlled for removal purposes).
19 This is not to say that the "independence" of the plaintiff's claims is wholly
unrelated to whether or not removal should be allowed, see note 23 infra, but such
an inquiry is an attack on the rear of the problem. The defendant's position may
be approached through the plaintiff's statement of it; however, such an approach
seems to call for confusion of the issues involved, and leads to concentration on the
method of determining how removal should be granted as an end in itself, losing
sight entirely of the defendant, as has been the case with § 1441(c).
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of decision, present inconsistencies in result could be resolved, 20 because the
same type of defendant will be allowed to remove in all instances, regardless of the procedural setting in which he is involved.
Moreover, by focusing on the defendant's position relative to the
court in which he is to appear, the statute would provide a policy to guide
the courts in defining all the operative statutory words, and the central
question posed by the "if-then" statement would become related in a direct
way to the underlying problem-the prejudice-vulnerable defendant.
It appears that the nature of the judicial process is such that without
the aid of explicit statutory standards the courts are incapable of developing
such a nonprocedural, defendant focused standard for removal cases involving partial diversity. Without such standards it seems likely that the
courts, abetted by the litigants, will always tend to do as they did with
section 71, that is, concentrate on a procedural issue (separability) and let
the direct prejudice problem fade into obscurity. No strongly felt impetus
presses the courts into allowing diversity removal, while there is a reason,
even if an unarticulated one, for inertia. In any given case, aside from the
difficulty of proving prejudice, one judge will be loathe to accuse another
of being so influenced as to cloud an impartial judicial determination, particularly when the state-federal relationship is involved. For courts thus
to accuse one another, no matter how well disguised the accusation may be,
certainly would not be considered by any judge to be in the best interest
21
of the judicial system as a whole.
This is not to say that such local prejudice is not operative; it is
merely to argue that the courts will not, because they cannot, find it to be
so. The determination must come from outside the judicial system; the
2 See Lancer Indus. Inc. v. American Ins. Co., 197 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. La.
1961). Compare Hafif v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 127 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (although liability of six insurers several, plaintiff's injury unitary, remanded),
and Compressed Paper Box Corp. v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 561
(D. Conn. 1954) (separate contracts covering separate hazards, but damage caused
by single storm, remanded), with Breslerman v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 169 F.
Supp. 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (action under separate policies covering seperate risks,
removal allowed), and Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
159 F. Supp. 738 (D. Md. 1958) (pro rata but separate policies, damages from an
explosion, removal allowed).
The inconsistency spoken of is that which results when the same type of defendant
(in terms of vulnerability to prejudice) is allowed to remove in one case and not
allowed to do so in another under similar circumstances. In the cases noted, precisely the same type of defendant is allowed to remove on the one hand, and is
remanded on the other, simply because of the procedural context within which he
finds himself due to the manner in which the plaintiff sets forth his claim. Cf. cases
cited note 18 supra. This is not to say that the cases are inconsistent within their
own terms. Insofar as "separate and independent" claims are concerned they are
close cases, leading to nice distinctions which offer a rationale for the result reached.
It seems clear, however, that such internal consistency is not sufficient to justify the
exercise of the removal power in a manner which is insensitive to the factor which
led to its creation, the prevention of discrimination against the out of state defendant.
21 Such accusations could be extremely damaging to the prestige, and, perhaps,
the power of the state courts involved. And if the state courts counter attacked, by
whatever means available, a further depreciation of respect for the judiciary could take
place. To question specifically the fairness of one court in ordinary matters of litigation is to cast suspicion on the fairness of all.
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courts here need to be told not only what is to be done but when, in direct,
definite terms which can be applied to any given situation. The result in
a given case would be merely one of a class of results which would not
cast any aspersions upon the particular court involved.
When the courts and bar turned to the "separable controversy" portion of section 71 and made it the focal point of removal cases, it seems
clear that they were striving to reach a concrete standard by means of a
satisfactory definition of "separable." 2
Quite possibly the reason that
they failed was that the problem was being approached from the wrongthe plaintiff's-end. There is certainly a relationship between the plaintiff's statement of his case and the status of the defendant relative to his
eligibility for removal,23 but to attack the problem in this way rather than
head on, looking directly at the defendant, seems to invite litigation.
It appears that it was this shift in focus from the basic policy question
to a related procedural problem which determined the form section 1441 (c)
took. As the bench and bar struggled with the concept of "separable controversies" they ceased to ask, at least explicitly, whether the removal was
justified in terms of the defendant's position, and became totally absorbed
in the interesting technical problem of defining "separability." The result
was a growing number of cases, due to a continuing inability to arrive at
24
a settled definition of the term.
When a rising tide of litigation and legal confusion finally provoked
legislative action, the revisors not unnaturally took the problem to be one
of procedural definition. They attempted to eliminate the problem by
limiting diversity removal to cases involving "separate and independent
claims," a device which, it was hoped, would end confusion and cut down
on the volume of diversity removal litigation. 25 Although Congress was
certainly aware of the provision in section 71 for allowing removal in cases
where discrimination could be proven, such a provision was not included
22 "Separable" is the operative word of § 71.
Once it was satisfactorily defined, the "if-then" structure of the statute would clearly dictate the result to be
reached by the courts in every case. "Separability" defied definition because the
underlying purpose of the statute was ignored as its central problem came to be one
of definition. What was essentially designed to be a means became the end itself.
2 This relationship in diversity removal is often explained as follows: There are
three different ways in which a plaintiff's statement of his case can be characterized.
He may (1) state a single, unitary cause of action against the two defendants; (2)
state a single cause of action containing "separable" controversies with each defendant;
or (3) state "separate and independent" claims or causes of action against each defendant. In the first instance it is thought that the trier of fact or the state judge

involved will not be able to operate to the prejudice of the out of state defendant
without hurting the interests of the local defendant. In the second case, the separability of the controversy is thought to expose the stranger to the possibility of prejudice,
and therefore, removal was formerly allowed under § 71. In the third case, the
stranger is again exposed, perhaps even more readily, to prejudice because the action
against him is so readily divorced from the action against the in state party. In the
latter two cases, then, the local court could act to the prejudice of the stranger without
hurting the local party. Under § 1441 (c) removal is allowed only in the third instance.
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964)
(revisor's note).
25

Ibid.
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in the 1948 amendment to the Judicial Code.26 Thus the courts are presently left with an "if-then" statement, section 1441(c), and are given no
definition of the operative words related to the primary purpose of diversity
removal jurisdiction. Rather the question is one which involves the "murky
waters of what is a cause of action," 2 7 a problem difficult to relate to the
questions faced in diversity jurisdiction.
In its only case construing section 1441(c), American Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Finn,8 the Supreme Court responded to the problem on this procedural level, delving into the pleadings to solve it without ever asking
whether or not removal should have been granted to the class of defendant
involved in the case. Perhaps a better description of what the Court did
would be: In an attempt to implement the congressional purpose behind
section 1441(c) the Court, after finding that Congress was interested
primarily in reducing the volume of federal removal litigation, defined
"separate and independent" in terms which would accomplish that end,
and inquired no further as to the effect of this result.
Briefly, the situation in the Finn case was as follows: Plaintiff, having
lost her house by fire, sued each of two insurance companies alleging
alternative liability and, also, both insurance companies and their common
local agent, alleging joint and several liability for the loss. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit thought that the complaint alleged separate
and independent claims or causes of action against the insurance companies within the meaning of section 1441(c).29 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the state court, saying in part:
The effectiveness of the restrictive policy of Congress against
removal depends upon the meaning ascribed to "separate and
independent * * * cause of action" . . . .
In a suit turning on the meaning of "cause of action," this
This Court
Court announced an accepted description ....
said,.... :
"Upon principle, it is perfectly plain that the respondent
suffered but one actionable wrong and was entitled to but one
recovery, whether his injury was due to one or the other of
several distinct acts of alleged negligence or to a combination of
some or all of them. In either view, there would be but a single
wrongful invasion of a single primary right of the plaintiff, namely,
Ibid.:
All the provisions with reference to removal of controversies between citizens
of different States because of inability, from prejudice or local influence, to
obtain justice, have been discarded. These provisions, born of the bitter
2

sectional feelings . . . [of] the Civil War . . . period . . . have no place

in the jurisprudence of a nation since united by three wars .
27
WRiGHT, FEm.A CouRTs 117 (1963).
28 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
29

...

American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 181 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1950).
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the right of bodily safety, whether the acts constituting such invasion were one or many, simple or complex."
[W] e conclude that where there is a single wrong to plaintiff,
for which relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of
transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause
of action under § 1441 (c).
In making this determination we look to the plaintiff's pleading, which controls.3 0
Thus section 1441(c) as interpreted by the Supreme Court fails to deal
with the question of whether the defendant is of the type who should be
allowed to remove. All of the discussion is in terms of what the plaintiff
stated or suffered. Finn is, at best, a mechanical description of what the
proper case for removal under section 1441(c) looks like: It speaks only
to when removal should be allowed to meet the congressional purpose, not
to why it should be allowed to the particular defendant. Under the statute
it could be no more.
Nevertheless, the courts speak as if there were a cogent policy behind
Finn and section 1441(c), and trouble little over their application of the
section except for the perennial policy statement that the section was designed to reduce the volume of federal removal cases,31 which is to say
nothing since the answer it tends to give in every case is "remand."
From the foregoing discussion it seems clear that the courts would
not and now cannot deal with diversity removal jurisdiction on the basis
of individually prejudiced courts. If the defendant's position is to become
the focal point of consideration, so that the law may be made responsive
to its premises, legislative action will be necessary. A solution which
offers the courts no more than a chance to develop their own defendant
focused standard will not be good enough. The history of section 71 offers
an example of the futility of such a course of action. There will be a
movement toward a procedural isolation of the courts from such a determination. Section 1441(c) is the fruit of such a movement.
The proposed ALI statutory revision offers an excellent and viable
alternative. The proposal embodies a readily discernible policy of allowing
removal only as a relief against possible discrimination in a self-defining
statute-one which the courts will apply, and which the bar can argue,
since Congress will bear the burden of having decided that a certain class
of defendants should be allowed to remove. Counsel contending for removal need not make any imputation of a discriminatory attitude on the
part of any particular court, thus avoiding the friction which would otherwise inevitably follow. Any such imputation will be vague in the particu8OAmerican Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 12-14 (1951).

8E.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.
N.Y. 1965).
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lar case, since the defendant's status as a member of a class susceptible to
discrimination-a "stranger in the state"-rather than the court's attitude,
is determinative.
The ALI proposals avoid the pitfall of concentrating on individual
defendants in particular courts. In so doing there is, of course, an ac32
ceptance of the fact that a few unnecessary removals will be allowed.
There may even be cases in which removal should be allowed when it will
not; but this problem cannot be remedied within the terms of a practically
functioning standard.P Any direct concentration on the possible prejudice
of an individual court seems doomed from the start, as well as being
impossibly inefficient when compared with systematic classification of
defendant types.
The heart of the ALI proposals is to change the diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts in such a way as to exclude all those who cannot
in some sense qualify as "true" strangers in the state and to open the
courts through removal or original jurisdiction to those who have a claim
to federal protection from local quirks due to their status as visitors or nonparticipants in the political life of the state. Speaking of its proposed
change the ALI has said:
Its basic principle is that the function of the jurisdiction is to
assure a high level of justice to the traveler or visitor from another
state; when a person's involvement with a state is such as to
eliminate any real risk of prejudice against him as a stranger and
to make it unreasonable to heed any objection he might make to
the quality of its judicial system, he should not be permitted to
choose a federal forum, but should be required to litigate in the
courts of the state.
In accordance with this principle, the most far-reaching proposal is to bar a plaintiff from the federal court in his home state.
Here the most convenient alternative will usually be a state court
in that state.
On the same basis, a corporation or other business enterprise
with a "local establishment" maintained for more than two years
in a state would be prohibited from invoking the jurisdiction,
either originally or on removal, of a federal court in that state
in any action arising out of the activities of that establishment.
Similarly, a natural person would be denied access to the federal
82 ALl Srtmy 52. However, the ALT estimates that acceptance of its proposals
will cause a substantial reduction in the overall number of diversity cases. Id. (Appendix B).
3 It should be noted that the proposed standard is supported by a clearly defined
purpose; under such a classification system it seems unlikely that the courts would
fail to bring a proper borderline case under the statute. For the unusual case in
which a defendant might deserve removal but be blocked by the terms of the statute,
a "demonstrable prejudice" clause, similar to that of § 71, might be a safeguard.
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court in the state where he has his principal place of business or
employment. These classes of persons would be barred from the
federal courts as plaintiffs in the same way that citizens would be,
and as defendants on removal in the same way that citizens already are. Here again the likely result is to leave in the appro34
priate state court cases which do not belong in the federal system.
The fact that a "business resident" not a citizen should be barred
from a federal forum even if the state court is arguably inadequate to
hear the case does not seem harsh if it is kept in mind that: (1) profit
is being derived from the association with the state; (2) the "resident"
noncitizen has a certain limited opportunity to affect the condition of the
state courts; and (3) his working association with the state seems to preclude discrimination against him as an outsider, since this association
makes him a "visible" member of the community.
Under the ALI scheme the plaintiff's characterization of the case is of
comparatively little importance, and the court is not forced to solve a
sterile procedural puzzle which, once mastered, reflects no rational policy
basis for its result. Section 1304, which generally defines the right of
removal, 35 reads in part as follows:
(a) Any civil action brought in a State court against a
single defendant, of which the district courts have jurisdiction
34 ALI STUDY 2, 3.
35 Section 1441(c) and the ALI Study's § 1304 share a common problem: they

both are open to a constitutional attack which stems from the clause in both which

allows the district court to acquire jurisdiction over the entire case once removal is
granted. See Lewin, supra note 8. There is little argument as to the constitutionality
of the removal if only one cause of action is involved, since this question has long
been settled under the theory of pendant or ancillary jurisdiction. Texas Employers
Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1945). But where two causes of action
are involved, one of them being nonfederal and nondiverse in nature, the question has
been directly passed upon only once, in Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor,
239 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Two courts summarily rejected the argument
of unconstitutionality without reaching the merits. Breslerman v. American Liberty
Ins. Co., 169 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (court stated that in any event it would
have had original jurisdiction of the case); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 159 F. Supp. 738 (D. Md. 1958) (all parties desired single
suit in the federal court).
The attack in Twentieth Century-Fox is based upon reading Strawbridge v.
Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) as a constitutionally required decision demanding complete diversity of all parties plaintiff and all parties defendant before the
federal courts can obtain jurisdiction under U.S. CoNsT., art. III, § 2. The opinion
in Twentieth Century-Fox was cast in two parts. The first argued that Strawbridge
v. Curtis was a case of statutory construction, since no Supreme Court decision
has ever treated it as anything more, and that § 1441 (c) therefore fell within the
ambit of article III, § 2, as do class actions, interpleader, and intervention suits, all
of which have been found constitutionally sound, and all of which involve something
less than total diversity of plaintiffs and defendants. The second argument maintained
that, even assuming that article III, § 2 required complete diversity, a separate ground
for allowing the operation of § 1441 (c) might be found in the "necessary and proper"
clause of article I, § 8, as Congress might be said to have exercised its power in this
respect to spare the litigants the expense and hazards of multiple litigation resulting
if the nonfederal, nondiverse elements must necessarily be remanded. The court argues
that such an exercise of power would be "necessary and proper" in order to implement
properly the grant of diversity jurisdiction in article III.
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founded on diversity of citizenship under section 1301 of this
title, may be removed by the defendant to the district court for
the district embracing the place where such action is pending
unless his invocation of removal jurisdiction of that district court
is prohibited by section 1302 of this title.
(b) Any defendant or third-party defendant who would have
been able to remove under subsection (a) of this section if sued
alone by any party making claim against him in the State court
action may remove the entire action to the district court. Any
person impleaded as a third-party defendant in the State court
action, however, may not remove if . . . he and the defendant

who impleaded him are both insured by the same liability insurer
or stand in any relationship of employer and employee or liability
insurer and insured. The district court may in its discretion
remand all matters that, considered separately, would not be
within its jurisdiction. Upon request made within twenty days
after any such order by the party or parties who removed the
action, all remaining matters shall also be remanded.a6
The proposed section makes it clear that the relationship of the defendant to the state in which the court is sitting is the crucial factor in
determining whether removal should be allowed. This is done by means
of the plug in to section 1302, the relevant sections of which follow:
(a) No person can invoke . . . [diversity]

jurisdiction,

either originally or on removal, in any district in a State of which
he is a citizen.
(b) No corporation incorporated or having its principal
place of business in the United States, and no partnership, unincorporated association, or sole proprietorship having its principal
place of business in the United States, which has and for a period
of more than two years has maintained a local establishment in a
State, can invoke that jurisdiction, either originally or on removal,
in any district in that State in any action arising out of the activi87
ties of that establishment.
The ALT offered the following reason for the first sentence in section
1304, which allows a defendant who is eligible to remove under sections 1301 and 1302 38 to do so with nearly complete freedom:
Once the availability of diversity jurisdiction is limited to those
"true" out-of-staters who are actually deserving of the protection,
15, 16.
at 11; see Appendix to this Comment for complete text, including a definition of "local establishment."
881d. at 8-12; see Appendix to this Comment for complete texts.
36 ALI STuDY
371d.
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the access of such persons to a federal forum should be as unhindered as possible. Thus, existing restrictions which prevent
removal of a state court action to a district court because of the
joinder of other parties not themselves qualified to remove, or for
other similar reasons, should be abrogated.3 9
The ALI strongly intimates that the original reasons for the grant of
diversity jurisdiction are lost in the past, 40 and at best, the explanations
commonly given are conjectures based on the intrinsic nature of diversity
jurisdiction and uncertain historical material. Therefore, the AL proposal sets up a self-contained scheme by which the form of the statute
dictates its content, including policy-a content consistent with, but not
dependent upon, outside historical material or justification. The federal
interest in the litigation is clearly defined-to prevent possible discrimination in the state courts against the true stranger in the state-thereby justifying the direct exercise of federal power in depriving the state courts of
jurisdiction.
The proposed statute, like sections 71 and 1441(c), is in the form
of an "if-then" statement. But, unlike its predecessors, it goes on to define
all of the operative words within the statutory scheme, so that the courts
in interpreting a particular provision need not be entirely dependent upon
judicial instinct in order to carry out the statutory purpose. A study of
the various defining clauses 41 and an analysis of their effect should provide
a very clear notion of the underlying policy objectives of the statute. This
means that the courts will be governed by principles directly related by the
statute to the problem of diversity removal jurisdiction, and they will not
have to fall back upon solutions worked out in connection with other
problems, as they did with section 1441(c) in order to define a "separate
and independent cause of action."
Although section 1304 is very similar to section 71, at least insofar as
the result sought in allowing removal of certain types of actions, the ALI
provision is superior not only in being self-defining, but also in that it
employs a direct attack upon the central issue. Unlike sections 71 and
1441(c), section 1304 looks directly at the defendant, and the operative
words are in terms which describe the defendant's position. 42 This change
along with the addition of the definitive clauses should render section 1304,
if adopted, a source of much less litigation than its predecessors.
39 ALI STUDY 55.
40
Id. at 48-49.
41

See Appendix to this Comment for complete text.

42 Ibid.
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APPFNDIX.
§ 1301.

General diversity of citizenship jurisdiction; amount in
controversy; costs

(a) Except as provided in this section and section 1302 of
this title, the district courts shall have jurisdiction, originally
or on removal, of any civil action between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof; or
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign
states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties;
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
(b) For the purposes of this section and section 1302 of
this title:
(1) A corporation shall be deemed a citizen of every
State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated
and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal
place of business.
(2) A partnership or other unincorporated association
capable of suing or being sued as an entity in the State in
which an action is brought shall be deemed a citizen of the
State or foreign state where it has its principal place of
business, whether such action is brought by or against such
partnership or other unincorporated association or by or
against any person as an agent or representative thereof.
(3) In any direct action by a person other than the insured against the insurer on a policy or contract of liability
insurance, such insurer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the
insured is a citizen, as well as of every State and foreign
state by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the
State or foreign state where it has its principal place of
business.
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(4) An executor, or an administrator, or any person
representing the estate of a decedent or appointed pursuant
to statute with authority to bring an action because of the
death of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of
the same State as the decedent; and a guardian, committee,
or other like representative of an infant or incompetent shall
be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the person represented.
(c) The word "State", as used in this chapter, includes the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
any Territory or Possession of the United States.
(d) When a plaintiff who files an action originally in the
district court asserting jurisdiction under this section is finally
adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value
of $10,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled,
and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny
costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the
plaintiff.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, whenever an action brought by or on behalf of any person is within
the jurisdiction of the district courts under subsection (a) of
this section, jurisdiction in that action shall also extend to any
claim against the same defendant if such claim (1) is brought by
such person on his own behalf or by or on behalf of any member
of his family living in the same household as such person and
(2) arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the action.
(f) No district court shall have jurisdiction under this section of any civil action arising under the workmen's compensation laws of any State.
§ 1302. General diversity of citizenship jurisdiction; exceptions
The jurisdiction of the district courts under section 1301 of
this title shall be subject to the following exceptions:
(a) No person can invoke that jurisdiction, either originally or on removal, in any district in a State of which he is
a citizen.
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(b) No corporation incorporated or having its principal place of business in the United States, and no partnership, unincorporated association, or sole proprietorship having its principal place of business in the United States,
which has and for a period of more than two years has maintained a local establishment in a State, can invoke that
jurisdiction, either originally or on removal, in any district
in that State in any action arising out of the activities of
that establishment.
The term "local establishment" as used in this subsection means a fixed place of business where or in connection
with which, as a regular part of such business: (1) services
are rendered or accommodations furnished to persons within
the State; (2) sales, delivery or distribution of goods are
made to persons within the State by one regularly maintaining a stock of goods or a showroom for the display of samples within the State; (3) sales of insurance, securities, or
other intangibles, or of real property or interests therein,
are made to persons within the State; or (4) production or
processing takes place. Dealings carried on through an independent commission agent, broker, or custodian do not
give rise to a local establishment.
The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to
entities organized or operated primarily for the purpose of
conducting a trade, investment, or other business enterprise.
(c) No individual citizen of the United States who has
and for a period of more than two years has had his principal place of business or employment in a State can invoke
that jurisdiction, either originally or on removal, in any district in that State.
(d) No person can invoke that jurisdiction, either originally or on removal, in any circumstances in which that
person, or an individual whose interests or estate that person represents, would have been barred under subsections
(b) or (c) of this section from doing so at the time the defendant's acts or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.
§ 1304. General diversity of citizenship jurisdiction; removal
of actions brought in State courts
(a) Any civil action brought in a State court against a
single defendant, of which the district courts have jurisdiction

724

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.114:709

founded on diversity of citizenship under section 1301 of this
title, may be removed by the defendant to the district court for
the district embracing the place where such action is pending
unless his invocation of removal jurisdiction of that district
court is prohibited by section 1302 of this title.
(b) Any defendant or third-party defendant who would
have been able to remove under subsection (a) of this section if
sued alone by any party making claim against him in the State
court action may remove the entire action to the district court.
Any person impleaded as a third-party defendant in the State
court action, however, may not remove if, with respect to the
claims made against them, he and the defendant who impleaded
him are both insured by the same liability insurer or stand in
any relationship of employer and employee or liability insurer
and insured. The district court may in its discretion remand all
matters that, considered separately, would not be within its
jurisdiction. Upon request made within twenty days after any
such order by the party or parties who removed the action, all
remaining matters shall also be remanded.
(c) A counterclaim asserted in a State court shall be
deemed an action for the purposes of this section and may be
removed by a plaintiff in the State court action if as a defendant
he would have been able to remove under subsection (a) or (b)
of this section. A third party impleaded on such a counterclaim
may remove if he would have been able to remove if impleaded
as a third-party defendant under subsection (b) of this section.
When the counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence as the plaintiff's claim in the State court, the entire
action shall be removed; otherwise, the counterclaim shall be
severed and separately removed.
(d) When a party would be barred from removing an action
in a State court under this section solely because the amount
claimed against him in the State court action is insufficient to
satisfy jurisdictional requirements, he may remove the action
for the purpose of asserting in the district court a claim which
he has against another party arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the claim against him and in which the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs. A statement of the proposed claim shall be
included in any petition for removal under this subsection.

